Outside View: Libya's oil prospects
By Reema Ali
Ali & Partners
Outside View Commentator
Distributed by United Press
International (UPI), March 9, 2005
Washington, DC, Mar. 9 (UPI) --
Libya's potential as an energy market has blossomed since economic
sanctions were lifted, and in January alone, the country awarded
licenses for 15 blocks of oil acreage under its Exploration and
Production Sharing formula. More licenses are expected to be issued
this year.
Certainly, the oil industry has fared better than other sectors
during the time Libya's economy was cut off from global markets.
Like other oil producing countries, Libya nationalized its oil
companies in the 1970s, but it stopped short of full
nationalization. In a declared attempt to obtain more control over
its oil production, Libya moved in the 1970s towards Participation
Agreements. Under these agreements, the newly established National
Oil Corporation became a majority partner of the foreign oil company
in return for an agreed compensation to the foreign oil company for
the nationalized share. NOC financed all operations and was subject
to the tax and royalty at the same percentage as its participation.
In 1974, NOC began to move towards the
Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements (EPSA). Under these
agreements the foreign oil company received a fixed percentage of
the output from the fields involved, negotiated on a case by case
basis. EPSA I was the model used in 1974 and EPSA II was used in
1980s, EPSA III was used in early 1990s, and EPSA IV is the current
model.
Since 1988 these agreements have been
more favorable to the foreign oil company. From a Libyan perspective
these agreements may not have been the best formula for Libya. Each
one of these models was an attempt to cure some of the problems that
arose from the prior model or dictated by the general conditions or
both.
In 2000, the Ministry of Energy was
abolished and NOC became fully in charge of the oil sector. This was
done so as to centralize the process, streamline it and make it more
transparent. However due to the sanctions and the general conditions
of the oil market, these agreements have continued to favor the
foreign oil company.
The EPSA contracts evolved in piece
meal rather than a concerted effort to develop an oil strategy for
the country. The lack of transparency of the process through which
these contracts were awarded further aggravated the situation. NOC's
participation in the capital expenditure had a negative impact on it
economically and had caused its resources to be diverted away from
its original objectives. Above all, the substitution of NOC
participation for the state royalty and tax created the impression
of two disinterested parties sharing the wealth of a third.
The first round of licensing had to
proceed in a timely manner for a variety of reasons least of which
is Libya's credibility, so the EPSA IV the formula had to be used.
The question of the day in Libya is
how best to exercise its sovereign rights over its oil resources at
the same time bring in the desired foreign investments and
expertise.
This raises two issues. What is the
formula that would best serve Libya's national interests? And
equally significant is which Libyan agency would be best suited to
have jurisdiction over these decisions?
Many in Libya would say that NOC should not be the agency in charge
and EPSA IV should not be the model used.
Historically, oil minister took the
lead in recommending oil policies. After nationalization and during
the sanctions era NOC was for some time the main or sole player.
Recently, the General People's Conference the highest political
organ in the country reinstated the Ministry of Energy, presumably
reactivating the old laws relating to the jurisdictions of these
agencies. This however, is not confirmed nor are the current laws
necessarily going to remain unchanged. Libya has been studying draft
Oil legislation and is embarking on an overhaul of its
administrative agencies. Moreover the relationship between the
parliamentary General Peoples Conference and the cabinet-like
General Peoples Committee was the subject of a great deal of debate
in January of this year at this year's session of the General
Peoples Conference.
Under EPSA IV, winners are determined
largely based on how high a share of production a company is willing
to offer NOC. In other words, whichever companies offer NOC the
greatest share of profits will most likely win under EPSA IV. The
foreign oil company initially bears 100% of costs for a minimum of 5
years, while NOC retains exclusive ownership. Management is assigned
to a committee comprised of two NOC representatives and one from the
outside investor; voting is unanimous. Other features of EPSA IV
include: open competitive bidding and transparency; joint
development and marketing of non-associated natural gas discoveries;
standardized terms for exploration and production; and
non-recoverable bonuses.
EPSA IV is a complex formula that
builds on the previous models under which significant components
were left to negotiations. Some in Libya would say the EPSA IV
formula is significant in increasing the Enhanced Recovery Rate,
others view it as a convoluted formula that no one understands and
does not fulfill the national aspiration.
Some changes are thus likely to take
place and the method with which the first round was done is not
necessarily how things would proceed. This it would seem is still an
open issue. What is certain is that the political risks of investing
in Libya have significantly subsided and this would have a profound
impact on the next round of negotiations.
--
(Reema Ali is the co-managing
partner of the law firm of Legwell, Ali & Partners. She specializes
in Middle Eastern laws, and is currently in charge of the firm's
Libya practice in Washington DC. She may be contacted at Reema@mideastlaw.com.)
back to articles list |